

was popularized in various ways by Herbert Marcuse, Georg Groddeck, and Wilhelm Reich. What poetic upheavals was one not justified in expecting from sentiments as universally felt as those of death, age, and illness? It was on the basis of this still marginal consciousness, Vaneigem believed, that the gradual revolution of daily life ought to take place—it was the only poetry made by everyone collectively, not by a single person.

With Alain, and then in a more pronounced way during the course of the twentieth century, one passed from happiness as a sort of recipe to happiness as a right and above all as a duty: I am owed happiness, but above all I owe it to myself, on pain of forfeiting my sense of self-worth. This is a fine example of a conquest that is converted into a constraint: henceforth it is forbidden not to be happy, for to be unhappy amounts to transgressing a social taboo—a curious contradiction of the doctrine of pleasure in its extreme version, which strips prohibitions of their coercive power and transforms desire into a categorical imperative. Having now become unlawful, and lost the redemptive capacity that once gave it meaning, unhappiness no longer finds a place in any discourse. It is characteristic of these three authors that in spite of their differences they share the same prejudice: suffering does not exist. Either it is the fruit of our imagination, of our fears (according to Alain), or it is the result of bourgeois morality and its taboos (according to Gide and Vaneigem). In this new configuration, whereby one is condemned to be happy, neither moral nor physical pain can even be mentioned. Pain therefore takes on the fantastic aspect of something that is denied and yet persists—a ghost that terrorizes all the more completely because one no longer knows what to call it.

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Hegel in France

In the appendix to *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, MICHEL FOUCAULT writes of his own intellectual indebtedness. It becomes clear in the course of his effort to acknowledge the effect that JEAN HYPOLITE had on his own thinking that Foucault's relation to G. W. F. Hegel was vexed at best. Hyppolite was the author not only of the French translation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a volume that was published in two volumes between 1939 and 1942, but also of *Genèse et structure de la phénoménologie de l'esprit* in 1947 and the director of an ongoing seminar on Hegel which included Foucault among its intermittent visitors. Foucault writes of this debt in a strange way, suggesting that to pay

the debt to Hyppolite and to Hegel would free him of the grasp of the master, and that something about Foucault's own theory of language amounts to a disloyalty, an irreversible separation. He concedes that a large part of his indebtedness is to Jean Hyppolite at the same time that he maintains that "our age . . . is trying to flee Hegel." He refers to being "disloyal to Hegel" but unable to escape him fully. Indeed, the effort to refute Hegel may well be but another Hegelian ruse, since, in being "against" him, one is still defined by him. Foucault thus remarks that we have to figure out "the extent to which our anti-Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands, motionless, waiting for us."

Foucault here seems to understand that it is difficult to negate Hegel, as Hegel is the one who has taught us that negation is a relation, one that binds the terms that it attempts to separate. So how would one separate from such a position without confirming that philosophical theory in the very act? Can one ever be paid off, be through with the debt? Or is it the case that as soon as one thinks that one is "done," there remains a relation to that completed trajectory, one which remains bound to it precisely as its aftermath?

This is, of course, a paradoxical way to characterize Hegel, as most of the French reception of his work has been quick to associate him with the notion of totality. But Foucault here suggests that Hegel stands for a certain aftermath, a surviving remnant, a postscript of some kind. Of course, Foucault is the very sign that Hegel is "over": he is the sign that Hegel has been surpassed by what is new or, at least, newer. But can we understand the meaning of that very sentence without knowing (a) what it is to surpass something, and (b) what of that which is surpassed survives in its aftermath? Hegel becomes, oddly, the name for what exceeds totality, and this is perhaps one of his distinctive contributions to French thinking in the twentieth century. He offers a way to think about historical time when the available totalities no longer work as explanatory models. In this sense, we might say that, in France, where MARXISM became articulated as a structuralist totality, Hegel comes "after" Marx.

We can read in various passages written by the early JACQUES DERRIDA and JACQUES LACAN that Hegel is a philosopher of "totality," of "systematic closure," of "conceptual mastery." In "From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve," for instance, Derrida considers GEORGES BATAILLE's elaborate engagement with Hegel, reading Bataille as taking Hegel to and beyond his limit. At stake is the place of "negativity" within the Hegelian system, whether this is a place or possibility for the negative that exceeds the work of reason. Derrida argues that the Hegelian notion of *Aufhebung* works to restrict life

within a conservative economy that incessantly reproduces "meaning." But what is there beyond the meaningful negation, preservation, and supersession of the past? Following Bataille, Derrida's answer is laughter. Laughter is precisely "not" meaning, but the way it is "not" meaning is not reducible to Hegel's notion of negativity.

Derrida goes on to say that "laughter is absent from the Hegelian system," and, though I do not think this is quite right, in the late 1960s at least, Hegel represented irredeemably an approach to thought which was centered on work rather than play, seriousness rather than laughter. That which is "without reserve," that which exceeds the logic of conservation itself, is, for Derrida, beyond Hegel, the beyond to which Hegel's system, at its limits, points, but to which it cannot venture.

If Derrida understands Hegel as foreclosing what is limitless, what exceeds the determinate "work" of reason, Lacan attributes to Hegel the notion that desire is always transparent to itself, that it not only knows itself but is always connected, of necessity, to the project of knowledge. For Lacan, in *Écrits*, it is Hegel's notion of desire (*Begierde*) that connects his philosophy with classical philosophical inquiry. The subject is one whose knowledge is based on the desire to know, and the subject is defined as one who effectively knows what it wants. Indeed, "Hegel's error in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*," Lacan writes, is precisely to miss the "opacity of the signifier," the split or division that the subject represents within the individual. Hegel misses this constitutive disjuncture, not realizing that the subject emerges on the basis of a splitting which lodges the signifier in and as the unconscious. There is no "overcoming" this constitutive disjuncture, and, in this sense, this split which inaugurates the subject represents, in a way that differs from Derrida's, another limit to the work of *Aufhebung*.

Of course, it would be possible to return to Hegel's text to refute each of these points, to show, for instance, that the postulation of an indeterminate negativity which exceeds the work of *Aufhebung* rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding of *Aufhebung* itself, to show that the subject of desire in Hegel's *Phenomenology* suffers from—and is mobilized by—a constitutive opacity to its desire. But what is perhaps more curious here is that these criticisms of Hegel rest on a rejection of an earlier set of Hegelian explorations in twentieth-century France. Hegel is being laid to rest, and his burial is the occasion for the new. What this means is that the earlier reception of Hegel's work is constituted as what is now over, and the transition to what is now relies not on the "work" of reason or its implied progressivism, but on a particularly dense trope of Hegel: Hegel

as the trope of a rational subject acting and producing history as progress.

Significantly, the earliest appropriations of Hegel in the twentieth century were precisely in the service of a critique of RATIONALISM, emphasizing Hegel's theological works and the theological dimension of the *Phenomenology* itself. Hegel's early theological writings appeared in German, edited by Herman Nohl, in 1907, and these subsequently became the basis for Jean Wahl's unprecedented reading of Hegel's "unhappy consciousness" in 1929 as a philosophy of a permanently divided subject, one whose self-division was grounded in the thought that spiritual life can never be fully or happily embodied in or by any individual. This accounts for Wahl's claim that Hegel is much closer to Søren Kierkegaard, and to a tragic conception of the human, than is generally assumed. It also leads to the thesis offered by Henri Niel in *De la médiation dans la philosophie de Hegel* (1945) that the *Aufhebung* does not operate in the service of a progressive or rational history but illustrates an ecstatic condition of the subject who is always equivocally defined in its relations with alterity. These religious readings of Hegel posit a subject who is, by definition, not self-identical, one whose access to spirituality is conditioned by the permanence of this self-division. Thus they open up the question of whether there is a "constitutive disjuncture" in the Hegelian subject, albeit different from the one that Lacan posits.

Indeed, one might fruitfully read the reception of Hegel by both Hyppolite and ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE as marking a form of Hegelianism that exceeds totality, resists and exceeds historical closure, undoes the claim of conceptual mastery and transparent self-knowledge. In many ways, both Hyppolite and Kojève extended the reflection on Hegel as a philosopher of religion. Kojève was originally employed as an assistant to ALEXANDRE KOYRÉ at the École des Hautes Études in the 1930s in the division of religious sciences. Significantly, as well, Hyppolite's own *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, originally published in 1946, ends on a note of religious incarnation. Wahl himself chose to center Hegel on the "Unhappy Consciousness" section of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, emphasizing the paradoxical character of a consciousness that knows itself as both pure ideation and pure finitude. This is a consciousness, the figure of a subject, who never knows itself at once, whose definition is to be always at a distance from itself at the moment of its self-knowing. The essence of this subject is, in fact, to "pass" constantly from one pole of its existence to another, and so to be defined as the very moment of transition. This is not a subject who confronts difference, whether its own differ-

ence from itself or its difference from something or someone outside itself, and then incorporates and digests that difference until it is remade as "identity." On the contrary, this is a subject who passes beyond itself to the object it knows, who is torn asunder by the act of knowing, who fails to be itself when it knows itself, and fails to know itself when it is itself. Does this fissure get "healed" as the *Phenomenology of Spirit* "progresses"? Or is this fissure the very condition of "progress" and so its limit as well? That this fissure is now assumed, as the subject emerges as "reason" within the *Phenomenology*, does not mean that it is somehow resolved, that there is no longer a fissure. It means only that the fissure becomes dynamic: the very meaning of temporality is impossible without this fissure. If it were to be resolved in the sense of being contained or negated, then the temporal movement of the text, of the recurring subject within the text, would have to stop.

Kojève's own seminars on Hegel (1933–39) at the École Pratique des Hautes Études took up Koyré's conception of time as well as his concern for human action and probed the question, How do we think about the historical actor when history itself no longer seems to promise a revelation of final truth or an ultimate harmony of perspectives? Among the enrolled students in that seminar were Lacan, Raymond Queneau, Bataille, Eric Weil, and others attending on an informal basis (apparently Hyppolite did not attend "for fear of being influenced"). Queneau subsequently edited the seminars as the text *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, published in 1947. For Kojève, the human subject is one who desires and acts in time, one for whom neither desire nor action make sense outside a future implied by both. Oddly, as a Marxist, Kojève did not emphasize that aspect of Hegel's theory of sociality that concentrates on the primacy of labor, on the dependence of the "Lord" on the "bondsmen" to take care of the material conditions of life. Rather than link desire with the problem of consumption that constitutes the economic dimension of the lordship-bondage relation, Kojève emphasized the relation between desire and recognition, arguing in fact that the desire for recognition can be understood as motive for human action and the impetus of history itself.

Kojève gave a distinctively anthropocentric reading to Hegel, one which sought to derive a philosophy of the human subject, what he called *l'homme*, from a philosophy generally considered to give agency over to an intersubjective spirit or a rationally driven history. The human subject is a necessarily dependent one, but its dependency is also the occasion for its autonomy. The subject desires to be recognized by another subject, one who is also defined by its very desire for recognition. The reciprocal recognition

that they afford each other does not come easily but must pass through a necessary violence, a conflict, a fight for life and death. Thus, Kojève sought to understand history as a violent struggle for recognition, one that has no internal "rational" motor, but which is always beset by the problem of domination and the threat of enslavement. The human subject only becomes human to the extent that its desire is manifest in an act that compels recognition by another, and so autonomy is achieved only in the context of sociality.

In a letter to Kojève written by Georges Bataille in 1937, Bataille, giving expression to a counterrationalist sentiment, sought to understand the implications for cultural life of the thesis that History, writ large, was now over. He writes, "I grant (as a likely supposition) that from now on history is ended . . . however, I picture things differently." Bataille objects to the notion that the negativity characteristic of human desire, its internal "lack" or "want," can be objectified in an action of any kind and thereby overcome. "Most often," he writes, "negativity, being impotent, makes itself into a work of art." Referring to "the negativity of a man with nothing left to do," he concludes that art does not supply a reason or direction for this negative existence but simply reflects "man [as a] recognized 'negativity.'" He refers to his alternative conception of negativity as a *negativité sans emploi*, an "unemployed negativity," suggesting that it is one that is freed of the constraints of the *Aufhebung*, as he understood it. Thus Bataille imagined Hegelian negativity beyond what he understood Hegel's notion to be, a negativity that "negated" Hegelian negativity without thereby resurrecting Hegel. As a result, although Kojève's view of Hegel made the human actor central, Bataille's response to Kojève made "man" almost fully dispensable. Thus the anthropocentric Hegel produced, one might say, a negativity that sought to unleash an "expenditure" that decentered the human from the very meaning of desire.

The point is made in a different way by MAURICE BLANCHOT when he reflects on "Literature and the Right to Death." For Hegel, the negative defines the human subject, and it is the task of human life to "convert the negative into being" and to "tarry with the negative." We not only know that we are finite and so defined in this life by a time in which we will *not* be; for Hegel, we are also the being who in some sense survives this negativity, the one who has this negativity, immanently, as its own desire. Thus, we desire because we die, and desire is the way in which we persist as beings defined by negativity. Blanchot displaces this anthropocentric discourse on desire by insisting that "we" do not survive the negative. The negative in the form of death stays with us in the world, defining our worldly experience. Our death does not merely belong to us, but

shows that we belong to the world. Death, for Blanchot, is the shattering of the world, in which a person is lost, "being" itself is annihilated, and even death itself is lost.

For Blanchot, the subject must meet its limit in death, must undergo a shattering that language somehow survives. But for JEAN-LUC NANCY, a contemporary French reader of Hegel, this limit emerges within Hegel himself: "Knowledge does not only know itself [*le savoir ne se connaît pas seulement soi-même*], but knows as well the negative of itself, or again, its limit. Knowing its limits means: knowing which sacrifices itself."

Thus, for Nancy, Hegel underscores the very moment of sacrifice, a term which is central to Bataille's counter-reading of Kojève's Hegel. But both Blanchot and Bataille, in different ways, attempt to point to a negativity which is beyond Hegelian negation. Whereas for Bataille it is an expenditure without reserve, for Blanchot it is the spectral life of the body as it survives the shattered body of the writer. Blanchot writes, "Where is the end? Where is that death which is the hope of language? But language is *the life that endures death and maintains itself in it*." Blanchot thus engages Hegel's language (in the "Preface" to the *Phenomenology*, it is "the labor of the negative" that endures death) in order to displace the human subject with language itself. Language is not the expression or instrument of "man," but the site of a life, an inhuman life, what marks human finitude and exceeds it: "When we speak, we are leaning on a tomb, and the void of that tomb is what makes language true."

Thus it remains curiously controversial whether the displacement of the subject is what Hegel precipitates or, indeed, formulates, or whether it is a (non-Hegelian) resistance to him that moves French thought beyond the anthropocentrism of Kojève's reading. Significantly, both Kojève and Hyppolite died in 1968, the year of the student protests, the year which in many ways marks the passing of the reign of Hegel in France and the advance of POST-STRUCTURALIST thought. And it was also at this moment, one might say, that the trope of Hegel became oddly congealed. One might, on the basis of the new paradigms inaugurated by this generational shift, expect that the relation to the Other is surely the place where we will find Hegel's subject ingesting difference and erecting identity. But the encounter between subject and Other is, by its very nature, unstable. No *deus ex machina* arrives to quell the equivocity that informs the encounter with alterity. As a result, one finds Jean-Luc Nancy, Gerald Lebrun, and Pierre Machery in recent French writings rethinking the trope of Hegel's subject as it was established in the decades before.

Many scholars assume that the reception of Hegel in the mid-twentieth century must, of necessity, be an exis-

ential Hegel, but Hegel also offered a theory of community, a context of intersubjectivity, for any theory of the subject. So though the subject suffers at the expense of the Other, and finds its relations to be invariably alienated, this alienation takes place as a dynamic relation, one which does not culminate in the thesis that posits the ultimate isolation of the self. In this sense, the French Hegel provided an important antidote to existential solitariness. Indeed, by the time JEAN-PAUL SARTRE wrote *Being and Nothingness* in 1943, Hegel was considered to be fully counterindividualist, a view which can only be derived from Kojève if the individualist strand in his work (against which Bataille rebelled) is denied. Hegelianism has been cast time and again as the promotion of a spirit or *Geist* that imperils individuality. For Sartre, the confrontation of one self-consciousness with another, the inaugural scene of the lordship and bondage chapter, is one in which one irreducible individual confronts another. Hegel's interpretation, which has both self-consciousnesses recognize their unity in an overarching structure, introduces a "deception in this very conflict since the end finally attained would be universal self-consciousness, 'the intuition of the existing self by the self.'" Here as everywhere we ought to oppose Hegel to Kierkegaard, who represents the claims of the individual as such." Later he maintains that Hegel's very singularity returns him in the end as a kind of verification of Sartre's own existential perspective. Hegel may not recognize himself as a singular individual, but that is no reason why we should forget that he is one. For Sartre, this means that there is at the heart of Hegel a *cogito* that is singular and irreducible to any notion of universality, setting the limit to any claims we might make about the equivalence of persons.

Hyppolite's own seminars took place as Sartre's work was becoming increasingly popular in France, and it constituted both an existential version of Hegel and a Hegelian counter to Sartrean individualism. Whereas both Kojève and Sartre insisted on the primacy of human action and its relation to a fundamental negativity in humans, Hyppolite sought to return the discourse of humanism to a more encompassing idea of history and temporality, one that countered anthropocentrism with an ethics or disposition of humility. It would not do to reduce the Hegelian notion of spirit to the discourse of "man," as "for [Hegel], man is *spirit*, that is, history and collective becoming; the truth which man can claim appears in and by this history."

For Hyppolite, it was important to counter the anthropocentrism of Kojève's reading by emphasizing not only *The Phenomenology of Spirit* but Hegel's *Logic* as well. He sought to achieve a balance between the anthropocentric reading of the *Phenomenology* and a view of the "Concept," that mode of knowing which takes place in a temporality

that, of necessity, exceeds the experiential life of the human knower. Lebrun may be understood as the contemporary inheritor of this strand in Hyppolite's writing. And it is interesting to note how this very notion of the "Concept" became compatible with the focus on language and the turn to STRUCTURALISM which marked the passing of Hegel from center stage within French intellectual life. Hyppolite sounded the resonances of these positions when, in 1966, he argued that language is precisely that which no individual creates. The nuances of language, as well as its syntax, determine the possible ways in which individuals might address one another. As a result, when anyone speaks, there is a question of how language speaks through that person. Hyppolite asked: "When I speak, I still must inquire and ask: Who speaks in me?"

From the Lacanian perspective, Hyppolite's question would still remain mired in the humanist problematic, however, for Lacan maintains that it is not a "who" that speaks in me, but a what: "Ça parle." The human is thus motivated by something which is not quite human, the unhuman, that which cannot be assimilated to the terms of the subject precisely because it is its necessary and constitutive outside.

Although Lacan made good use of the Hegelian concept of desire, we noted that desire is beset by an opacity, conditioned by a split, which severs it from the possibility of self-knowledge. Of course, there is a question as to whether Hegel connects desire to self-knowledge or whether self-knowledge, caught up in the circuit of desire, comes to sacrifice itself at the limits of its knowing. This vacillation is a crucial one, and I believe the arguments on both sides give us a sense of the repeated paradoxes of Hegel in twentieth-century France.

In seminar 7, Lacan considers the charge against him that he is "powerless to resist the seductions of the Hegelian dialectic." He understands that his own work on the "dialectic of desire" doubtless prompted such an accusation, but he is uncertain whether the charge was deserved. He goes out of his way to judge Hegel fiercely, claiming, for instance: "Hegel nowhere appears to me weaker than he is in the sphere of poetics, and this is especially true of what he has to say about *Antigone*."

What offends Lacan about Hegel's reading of *Antigone* is that Hegel tends to make Antigone and Creon represent opposite principles or forces, kinship versus the state, the individual versus the universal. Lacan insists that the "tragic" element of Sophocles' play consists in the difficulty that is internal to desire itself. We desire to do what is good, but something provokes a detour for our desire, and we find ourselves compelled in another direction. What provokes the detour is something "enigmatic" in desire, a remainder,

an unknown something, which is nevertheless the "ça," the uncanny, inhuman something which compels us against our "knowledge." Poetics must surely contend with this unrepresentability, this limit or "threshold" of the symbolic itself.

Lacan is not the only one offended by Hegel's reading of *Antigone*. LUCE IRIGARAY offers a strong criticism of his reading in her essay "The Eternal Irony of the Community," where it becomes clear that the "subject" is precisely the political problem. There, as in some other of her essays on kinship, she makes clear that Hegel has too quickly moved into a consideration of "universality" that is not only disembodied, inhuman, and bloodless but has violence at its core. In her view, Antigone represents the blood tie; she reasserts the value of the earth, the body, and ties of kinship over and against a masculine "universal" which seeks to dissociate itself from its own radical dependency on the maternal. Irigaray enters the dialectical logic through which Hegel comes to distinguish Creon and Antigone and to argue that the ties of kinship must be superseded by the ties to the state. Irigaray reverses this argument, using Hegel's own language against him, locating the "ethical" moment in her very insurgence, and showing how the universal can only become undone by its dialectical "Other." Indeed, the "Other" that women come to represent is outside the dialectic of subject and Other. That dialectic turns out to be a fight to the death among men, and women are the "living mirror," the "still living substance of nature [who] will sacrifice her last resources to a formal and empty universality."

For Irigaray, the "subject is always already masculine," but a different political appropriation of Hegel's subject takes place in the work of FRANTZ FANON, especially the section of *Black Skin, White Masks* titled "The Negro and Hegel." Fanon appears especially indebted to Kojève in 1952. His words could almost be derived directly from Kojève: "Man is human only to the extent to which he tries to impose his existence on another man in order to be recognized by him." The demand for recognition is made precisely by the Black "man" in Fanon in order to emerge from a less-than-human state into the norms that govern the constitution of the human itself. Accordingly, recognition is linked to desire, and both are linked to the possibility of political emancipation. Fanon understands the desire for recognition to be implicit to human desire as such. Over and against the "thingness" in which the racialized man is "sealed," Fanon invokes and pursues an "I" who would make its demand for recognition as a being who is capable of negation, understood as part of freedom and creative action. Indeed, the negation and creation that Fanon imagines is one in which "a human world" comes into being, "a world of reciprocal recognitions."

For Fanon, desire comports the human subject beyond and outside himself, to the creation of the human itself through the process of mutual recognition. Whereas Sartre maintained that "I cannot transcend my being toward a reciprocal and universal relation in which I could see my being and that of others as equivalent," Fanon insists on this form of universality. It is not there as an already accomplished presupposition of social life, a constraining or constituting structure, but is the contingent effect of a creation, an accomplishment. And it would not be quite right to say that this is a human accomplishment, as it is the accomplishment of the human as a necessarily futural horizon, a possibility that governs political struggle but which is not yet achieved.

For Fanon, then, the Hegelian subject is precisely what is not "closed," that is, "here and now, sealed into thingness." Its ecstatic compartments situate the subject as the agent and effect of the exchange of recognition itself. Where this is no such exchange, the human has not yet occurred. One might object that Fanon is too humanist, but it may be important to understand the permutation of humanism that he has effected. For he does not assume that the "subject" is already achieved, and he understands that its "action" cannot be generated exclusively from itself. Irigaray reminds us, of course, that the subject is always already masculine. But what of the subject who is not "always already"? Who is the subject for the future? And how does the future define this subject, produce the resources from which it makes its claims?

In recent years, Jean-Luc Nancy and Catherine Malabou have returned to Hegel's notion of "the speculative" as a way to find an alternate subject or, indeed, an alternative to the subject, within Hegel's work. The speculative sentence is one in which the grammatical subject does not keep its place, where it can be found as the object and the subject at once, and where this simultaneity and reversibility produce an experience of reading as perpetual motion. The subject is not where it claims to be, and it exceeds the expectations of grammar by which it is articulated. In Fanon's terms, "I am for somewhere else and for something else." Indeed, there is no *I* without its elsewhere, and whether it is human, inhuman, or divine, it shows that the subject is a certain experience of slipping away, yielding to alterity, undergoing transformation by virtue of passing through what is strange with no expectation of return.

Judith Butler

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Heidegger in France

For a dialogue to blossom, for a friendship to deepen, the proper distance is needed. Between two neighboring peoples, this distance is never simple to find. The Franco-German dialogue is no exception. Initiated under unfavorable conditions, with the occupation of German territories by Napoleon's armies, and disturbed by the war of 1870–71, it began to flourish only during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. For a brief time the ideas of Arthur Schopenhauer were fashionable among French Symbolists, and certain of Friedrich Nietzsche's works benefited from prompt translation. But this nascent conversation was suddenly interrupted by the First World War.

When the nightmare ended in 1918, it was necessary to face facts. The clash between rival nationalisms for more than a century had left immense gaps in each country's knowledge of the other. Whole areas of German philosophy were still unknown in France. To be sure, the doctrines of Immanuel Kant were familiar, as were those of the neo-Kantian movement, whose influence in French academic life was associated with the work of LÉON BRUNSCHVICG (1869–1944). But French philosophy knew virtually nothing of G. W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Schelling, Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, or—less surprisingly—of contemporary thinkers such as Edmund Husserl.

Under the impetus of a small number of committed Germanophiles, and encouraged by the rebirth of a pacifist spirit in intellectual circles, a dialogue across the Rhine nonetheless gradually resumed in the late 1920s. Three German philosophers, in particular, were the chief beneficiaries of this development: Hegel, Husserl, and Martin Heidegger, all of whom were discovered at about the same time and by the same French philosophers.

The point of departure for Hegelian studies in France was a book by Jean Wahl, *La malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel* (1929). During the 1931–32 academic year, in the Fifth Section (religious sciences) of the École Pratique des Hautes Études, ALEXANDRE KOYRÉ gave a course on the religious philosophy of the young Hegel, based on his writings in Jena and later published in Koyré's *Études d'histoire de la pensée philosophique* (1961). During the summer of 1933, having accepted an invitation to teach in Cairo, Koyré proposed that his young friend ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE replace him at the École Pratique. Kojève and